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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Middle East is comprised of a wide geographic area, stretching from 
Morocco in the northwest corner of Africa to Oman at the tip of the Arabian 
peninsula in the east, and from Iraq in the north to the Sudan, a portion of which is in 
sub-Saharan Africa, to the south. The countries that comprise the Middle East are 
quite different from one another in terms of their economic development, the 
structure of their economies, and the extent to which they are integrated into the 
world’s economy. Some countries, such as Syria, have relatively closed economies 
with limited economic interaction with the West and limited inbound or outbound 
flows of capital. Other countries in the Middle East, in particular the countries of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), are more closely tied to the global economy and 
their performance is more directly affected by world economic conditions. The 
countries of the GCC, which are situated opposite Iran along the southern and 
western sides of the Arabian Gulf, are comprised of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait. The population of these 
countries ranges from 25 million in Saudi Arabia, the largest country in the GCC, to 
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700,000 in Bahrain, a small island state. These countries have the good fortune of 
possessing the most significant oil resources in the world. The GCC countries not 
only derive a substantial portion of their gross domestic product (GDP) through the 
export of oil and petroleum products, but they also are exporters of capital to other 
regions of the world and are a destination for capital investment. These countries are 
not representative of the entire Middle East, but they are the countries that are most 
frequently discussed and of concern in the West because of their significant oil 
resources and their strategic location. It is these countries of the GCC on which I am 
focused.  
II.  IMPACT OF THE WORLD ECONOMIC CRISIS 
The world economic crisis affected countries in the Middle East in much the 
same way that it affected countries in the West, and the responses of the 
governments of these countries were generally consistent with the responses of 
governments in other parts of the developed world. Aggregate real GDP growth of 
the GCC economies dropped to 0.8% in 2009 from a robust 7.2% in 2008. Inflation 
in the GCC economies dropped to 2.5% in 2009, from 11.1% in 2008. Banks had 
liquidity problems, and most GCC countries had housing bubbles that burst. Housing 
prices dropped by 52% in the Emirate of Dubai, by 35% in Qatar, and by a 
whopping 62% in Kuwait. 
On a country-by-country basis, the drop in real GDP growth was significant in 
some countries and insignificant in others.  Saudi Arabia’s real GDP growth went 
from just below 5% in 2008 to almost flat in 2009. GDP growth in the United Arab 
Emirates dropped below zero in 2008, and the same occurred in Kuwait. Qatar, 
which holds some of the world’s largest natural gas reserves, saw its real GDP 
growth drop by one-half, from almost 20% in 2008 to just under 10% in 2009. 
Oman’s real GDP growth fell from 12% in 2008 to approximately 3% in 2009, while 
Bahrain’s fell from just over 5% in 2008 to almost flat in 2009.  
The responses of the governments of the GCC were not especially unique. Like 
the governments of Western countries, GCC governments sought to make the 
financial and credit markets more liquid by reducing interest rates and the reserves 
required to be maintained by financial institutions at their central banks. To avoid a 
run on deposits at financial institutions, GCC governments guaranteed the repayment 
of deposits. They also provided financial institutions with dollar swap facilities so 
that local businesses could satisfy their dollar payment obligations. Governments 
placed deposits with local banks to provide them with additional liquidity, and they 
invested in regional stock markets to support share prices. Many of these measures 
were the same as those measures adopted by Western governments that were 
experiencing the same problems and risks. 
III.  GROWTH OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 
One of the distinguishing features of the GCC countries is that an increasing 
segment of its population has sought for the past three decades to conduct its 
financial affairs in a manner consistent with principles of Islamic Shari’ah. A 
number of financial institutions that operate in compliance with the principles of 
Islamic Shari’ah have been established in this region in response to that demand. In 
addition, Shari’ah-compliant financing and investment activities have continued to 
grow in countries outside the GCC region. 
Proponents of Islamic finance have regularly claimed that this system of 
economics is in some respects superior to the conventional economic system because 
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of its avoidance of socially harmful activities, its emphasis on investment in 
productive assets, and its promotion of equity investment where risk is shared by the 
parties rather than interest-based lending in which a lender is repaid even if the 
borrower’s enterprise is not successful. These proponents have also claimed that 
financial institutions and investment firms operating in accordance with Shari’ah 
principles would be immune to the problems often suffered by conventional, 
interest-based institutions. 
The current financial crisis gives us the opportunity to determine whether there is 
any merit to this view − whether in fact this growing and increasingly significant 
segment of the economies of the GCC did respond differently to the world financial 
crisis. Before beginning this examination, however, we first need to have a basic 
understanding of the nature of Islamic financial institutions and the manner in which 
they operate.  
IV.  NATURE OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 
Investing in conformance with Islamic Shari’ah is viewed as a form of socially 
responsible investing. Financial institutions and companies that operate on a 
Shari’ah-compliant basis seek to avoid investment in industries that manufacture 
products, or are engaged in activities, that are viewed as being harmful, such as 
tobacco, alcohol, casinos, weapons, and products that are religiously proscribed, 
such as pork. There is an emphasis on equity investment and the sharing of risk. 
Financing is permitted but it generally must involve a productive asset. The 
prohibition on the payment or receipt of interest is one of the central distinguishing 
features of Islamic finance. This prohibition is a common feature of many religions, 
including Judaism and Christianity, although to a large extent these two religions 
have dropped this restriction.  
Although Islam is a 1,400 year-old religion, modern Islamic finance is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. It began in the 1960s with the establishment of the 
first Islamic bank in Egypt. There were a few more Islamic financial institutions 
established in the 1960s and 1970s, but it was not until the 1980s that Islamic 
finance in its modern form took off with the establishment of Shari’ah-compliant 
institutions in the GCC and Malaysia. Today, there are over 200 Islamic financial 
institutions in the world. These firms operate in accordance with principles of 
Islamic Shari’ah, and that requirement is generally set out in their charter. 
 Although Islamic institutions are concentrated in the GCC countries and 
Malaysia, Islamic finance has become an international phenomenon. Almost every 
week a new Islamic financial institution or investment company is established in one 
jurisdiction or another, and the growth of Islamic finance outside the Middle East is 
generally concentrated in Central and Southeast Asia, and Europe. London, for 
example, recently licensed its fifth Islamic bank and has proclaimed its desire to be a 
center for Islamic finance. Although the United States does not have any banks that 
operate in compliance with Islamic Shari’ah, it does have nineteen organizations, 
banks included, which offer Shari’ah-compliant products. As an example of the 
growth of Islamic finance in the United States, the City of Minneapolis recently 
announced the establishment of a Shari’ah-compliant financing program for Muslim-
owned businesses.  
These developments are largely driven by market demand. Shari’ah-compliant 
institutions would not be established or continue to exist if the local population was 
not interested in these alternative financing mechanisms. Not only does this demand 
stimulate the establishment of these institutions, but it also justifies the expense 
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necessary to develop Shari’ah-compliant financing and investment products. 
Moody’s, a credit rating agency which performs international financial research and 
analysis on commercial and government entities, recently estimated that the Islamic 
finance market has reached $950 billion, and it foresees the market reaching $5 
trillion in the near future. Islamic finance has experienced steady growth in GCC 
countries and today it represents 20% of the GCC market, with the remainder of the 
market operating on a conventional basis.    
A.  Role of Shari’ah Scholars 
Who decides whether a particular investment or transaction is in compliance with 
principles of Islamic Shari’ah? Ultimately, it is the market that will accept or reject a 
product that is claimed to be Shari’ah-compliant, but in making that determination 
the market will rely on the opinions of scholars who are recognized as being experts 
in Shari’ah principles and their application. There is currently no central authority 
for the licensing or certification of these Shari’ah scholars. Nearly every Islamic 
financial institution, investment company, or fund will have an external board of 
Shari’ah advisors that will be comprised of recognized scholars, many of whom 
serve on multiple boards. This advisory board will generally review the operations 
and significant transactions of the Islamic institution to confirm that they are in 
compliance with principles of Islamic Shari’ah, and it will then issue a letter to that 
effect that will be included in the institution’s annual report, much like an auditor’s 
letter.  In addition, the Shari’ah advisory board will issue a written opinion, known 
as a fatwa, approving a specific transaction or activity as being in compliance with 
principles of Islamic Shari’ah.  
There are over 200 Shari’ah scholars that have some measure of market 
recognition. Those scholars that understand modern commercial transactions and are 
fluent in English are the ones that generally have the greatest international 
recognition and serve on multiple boards. There are between ten to twenty Shari’ah 
scholars that fall into this category. It is a unique feature of Islamic finance that the 
approval of financing and investment transactions, and in particular new structures 
and products, is controlled by a small group of religious scholars. 
Depending on the size or activities of the financial institution or investment 
company, it may also have on staff one or more employees who have knowledge of 
Shari’ah principles. These Shari’ah-knowledgeable employees are responsible for 
looking after day-to-day issues, often in consultation with the external Shari’ah 
advisory board.   
B.  Investment and Financing Activities of Islamic Financial Institutions 
Guided by the principles of Shari’ah, as interpreted and applied by Shari’ah 
advisors, Islamic financial institutions have been making various equity investments 
for their own account and on behalf of their clients for the past two decades and have 
been providing Shari’ah-compliant financing products to their commercial and retail 
clients. An understanding of how the world economic crisis impacted Islamic 
financial institutions requires a basic understanding of the nature of these equity 
investments and financing products. On equity investments, I would like to focus on 
real estate investments and Shari’ah-compliant mutual funds. I will also be 
examining sukuk, which can take the form of an equity investment or a financing 
transaction depending on the nature of the sukuk. Sukuk are particularly interesting 
because the difficulties with sukuk arising from the world economic crisis resulted in 
notable governmental responses. 
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1.  Real Estate Investment 
A significant portion of the equity investments made or sponsored by Islamic 
financial institutions have been in real estate. Property funds of all types have been 
established, including funds that are region or country specific, such as funds 
focused on real estate in the U.S., Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, and funds that 
invest in certain types of real estate. 
Investments in real estate are subject to several Shari’ah requirements. First, 
property cannot be leased to companies that are engaged in business activities that 
are not in compliance with Shari’ah. This restriction precludes leasing property to 
commercial tenants that, for example, are interest-based financial institutions, are 
involved in the manufacture or sale of alcohol or pork products, or whose primary 
business is in the gaming or movie industry. These restrictions do not apply, 
however, to the activities of tenants of residential properties. As a result of these 
restrictions, most of the Shari’ah-compliant property funds are focused on residential 
apartment complexes, industrial facilities, medical office buildings, and senior living 
communities.  
In addition to these usage restrictions, if acquisition financing is needed, 
conventional interest-based loans may not be used. Instead, the leverage must be 
provided using a Shari’ah-compliant structure, such as ijara wa-iqtina, which is a 
leasing arrangement that is similar to a finance or capital lease, or murabaha, which 
involves the sale of the property at a price equal to cost plus an agreed-upon profit, 
with payment of the purchase price to be made in installments over an agreed-upon 
time period. These financing structures, although clearly tied to an asset, are often 
indirectly funded by or based on conventional interest-based financing, or they are 
structured to have the same economic impact. 
Islamic financial institutions, acting as equity investment sponsors, arranged a 
number of property investment funds that invested in real estate in GCC and Western 
countries, including significant investments in the United States. In keeping with 
Shari’ah requirements, these investments were in permissible types of properties, 
and they were typically financed with Shari’ah-complaint structures such as the 
above-mentioned ijara wa’iqtina and murabaha structures. These financing 
arrangements were structured to function in a manner very similar, if not identical, to 
conventional financing structures, and if the investments were made in the United 
States, these Shari’ah-compliant financing structures generally were treated for tax 
and accounting purposes in a manner generally the same as conventional, interest-
based financing structures. 
Because of this similarity, when the world financial crisis hit, these property 
investments performed as poorly as conventional property investments, if not worse. 
As vacancies rose in commercial property investments, Shari’ah-compliant 
investment funds were restricted from leasing property to tenants engaged in 
impermissible activities. These restrictions reduced the flexibility of the Shari’ah-
compliant investment fund owning the property as it limited the number of potential 
creditworthy tenants, and sometimes also limited the redevelopment opportunities.  
In addition, as the property financing obtained by these Shari’ah-compliant 
investment funds was structured to mimic the economic effect of conventional, 
interest-based financing, these property investments were subject to the same 
financial pressures as conventionally financed property investments. As a consequ-
ence, from an equity investment standpoint, property investments undertaken by 
Shari’ah-compliant investment funds performed in a manner comparable to 
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conventional property investments. In the context of the world financial crisis, this 
meant that a comparable number of these investments went into default and suffered 
foreclosure, and those investments that avoided such fate experienced a decline in 
value comparable to the declines experienced by conventional property investment 
funds. In other words, the view of some proponents of Islamic finance − that it is 
superior to a conventional, interest-based system − turned out not to be true when it 
came to property investments that were structured and financed in a manner 
comparable to conventional property investments. 
2.  Mutual Funds 
Investments in mutual funds have also been prominent, especially when stock 
markets were booming, and dozens of Shari’ah-compliant mutual funds have been 
established in the past two decades. These funds have varying investment objectives 
-- some invest in specific sectors, such as healthcare, while others have a country or 
regional focus. Some funds invest in private equity or venture capital transactions, 
and lately several hedge funds that are claimed to be in compliance with Shari’ah 
have been launched.  
Mutual funds typically invest in the shares of publicly-listed companies and, 
whatever the strategic focus of the mutual fund, those companies in which mutual 
funds invest need to satisfy the same types of considerations applicable to property 
investments, meaning they cannot be engaged in impermissible activities. This 
restriction rules out investments in alcohol and tobacco companies, companies 
involved in the gambling industry or the production of pork products, interest-based 
financial institutions, and weapons manufacturers.  
The typical Shari’ah-compliant mutual fund will develop a “Shari’ah screen” in 
cooperation with its Shari’ah advisors or it will adopt one of the recognized Shari’ah 
screens. The Shari’ah screen will set out the criteria that will be applied to 
companies to determine whether they are considered to be in compliance with 
Shari’ah principles. The mutual fund manager may then invest in the shares of 
companies that are within this universe of Shari’ah-compliant companies. 
In addition to screening out companies based on impermissible activities, a 
Shari’ah screen will also analyze the financial position of a company to determine 
whether it satisfies financial requirements. The primary purpose of the financial 
screen is to eliminate those companies that are overly leveraged with conventional 
debt. Shari’ah scholars have recognized that if investments in companies with any 
interest-based financing are prohibited, then Islamic mutual funds would not have 
many companies in which to invest, as almost all public companies have some 
amount of conventional financing. As a compromise, Shari’ah scholars concluded 
that it would be permissible to make minority investments in companies that have a 
moderate level of debt capital, which is generally set at a 1:3 ratio of debt to total 
assets. Companies that are leveraged beyond that level are impermissible, as is a 
controlling investment in any such company (unless the investor replaces the 
conventional financing with forms of Shari’ah-compliant leverage). For our 
purposes, the key result of the application of these activity and financial tests as part 
of a Shari’ah screen is that investments in interest-based financial institutions and in 
companies that are overly leveraged are precluded.  
Some of the financial service companies, such as Dow Jones, Thompson Reuters, 
and FT of London, maintain Shari’ah-compliant indices and license their indices to 
fund sponsors that want to form mutual funds. These indices will identify on an on-
going basis those companies that comply with the applicable Shari’ah screen, adding 
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and removing companies from the permissible companies list as their activities and 
financial positions change over time. If a mutual fund relies on its own Shari’ah 
screen rather than license an established index, it will assume responsibility for 
monitoring the activities and financial position of companies that have previously 
satisfied its screen.   
As we approached 2008, the Islamic financial sector was expanding at a rapid 
rate and was attracting a growing market, not only in the GCC but in a number of 
other jurisdictions. Between 2005 and 2008, the number of Shari’ah-compliant 
mutual funds doubled to more than 500, and it was projected at the time that this 
number would increase to 700 mutual funds by 2010. On average, their performance 
leading up to the financial crisis was not materially better or worse than the 
performance of comparable, conventional mutual funds.  
Once the financial crisis hit, however, the performance of Shari’ah-compliant 
mutual funds did not suffer to the same degree as the performance of conventional 
mutual funds. Their returns and size did decline during the 2008-09 period as the 
share prices of companies in their portfolios were battered by the financial crisis, but 
the declines they experienced were less severe than the declines suffered by 
comparable, conventional mutual funds. For example, Standard & Poor’s in 2008 
observed that in the Middle East and North Africa region, Shari’ah-compliant mutual 
funds “outperformed” similar conventional funds because the losses they suffered 
were not as severe, dropping by 29% in comparison with a 34% drop in the S&P 
index.  
Market commentators were quick to point out that the observance of Shari’ah 
principles was resulting in the superior performance that had been predicted. The 
underlying reasons for this better performance were quite obvious, however. 
Financial institution stocks were among those that were the most severely affected 
by the financial crisis, so the prohibition on investment in those stocks served 
Islamic mutual funds quite well. In addition, as the financial crisis also resulted in a 
contraction of the credit markets, companies that were heavily leveraged were 
negatively affected. The Shari’ah screens had the beneficial effect of steering Islamic 
mutual funds away from those overly-leveraged companies. 
This superior performance of Islamic mutual funds was short-lived. As the stock 
market began to recover, those stocks that led the way were financial institution 
stocks. Although Islamic mutual funds avoided the pain of holding financial 
institution stocks when the crisis hit, they also missed out on the gains that were 
recorded by financial institution stocks as stock markets began to recover. 
Looking at property investments complying with principles of Islamic Shari’ah, 
we saw that their performance was no better and no worse than conventional 
property investments. As property markets declined, they brought down both 
conventional and Shari’ah-compliant property investments. If a Shari’ah-compliant 
property investment utilized leverage, that investment was as affected by adverse 
property market conditions as a conventional property investment financed with 
conventional leverage. The fact that an investment had its leverage structured on a 
Shari’ah-compliant basis did not mitigate the effects of the financial crisis. A 
Shari’ah-compliant property investment could be foreclosed with no materially 
greater effort than a conventionally-financed property investment. 
3.  Rise and Fall of Sukuk 
You may have heard of the financing and investment instruments known as 
sukuk. Sukuk came to prominence several years ago when Dubai World, a 
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commercial enterprise wholly-owned by the Emirate of Dubai, sought to acquire the 
port operation business of P&O, a large port operator. This potential acquisition 
generated significant controversy in the United States because several of the P&O 
ports to be taken over were located in the United States, and there was an uproar in 
Congress over foreign control of U.S. ports. That acquisition was eventually 
completed and it was financed with a $2.8 billion offering of sukuk, which at the 
time was a particularly unique way of financing a major transaction of this type.  
Sukuk instruments generally represent an interest in an underlying, Shari’ah-
compliant transaction. If the underlying transaction has the characteristics of a 
financing, such as a lease (ijara) transaction, then the sukuk that are issued (which 
essentially grant an indirect interest in the underlying transaction) will be treated as a 
debt instruments. If the underlying transaction has the characteristics of an equity 
investment, then the corresponding sukuk will be treated as equity instruments. Most 
of the sukuk that have been issued are treated as debt instruments. Sukuk have 
received an inordinate amount of attention in Islamic finance circles because they are 
capital markets transactions (which generally have a higher profile) and because they 
are viewed as being important to the development of an Islamic capital market.  
Sukuk offerings have grown significantly in importance and size since its first 
offering - a sovereign issuance by Malaysia in 2002. Most sukuk offerings take place 
in the GCC and Malaysia, with a significant number of offerings being undertaken 
by sovereigns or state enterprises. Recent sukuk issuances include a large offering by 
the government of Indonesia. GE Capital also recently financed a commercial 
aircraft with a sukuk offering out of the U.S., the second one done in the U.S. in the 
last five years. The United Kingdom and France have discussed the possibility of 
sovereign issuances and have begun to look at the legislative changes that might be 
necessary to permit such issuances.  
In 2007, five years after the first Malaysian offering, sukuk issuances reached 
$25 billion, and indications were that this fast-paced growth would continue. In 
2008, however, sukuk offerings dropped to $16 billion, and were nominal in 2009. 
We have witnessed a resumption of sukuk issuances in 2010, and indications are that 
this trend will continue.  
4.  Sukuk Defaults 
As the world economic crisis hit the Middle East in 2008-09, we witnessed a 
number of defaults and near defaults affecting sukuk issuances. One situation that 
received significant attention, both because of its size and the involvement (as 
investors) of Western financial institutions, was the potential default of Nakheel, a 
significant subsidiary of Dubai World. Nakheel is the real estate company that 
developed the striking Palm Islands off the coast of Dubai, one of several high-
profile real estate developments that it undertook. Nakheel financed its development 
activities with both conventional debt and Shari’ah-compliant financing, including a 
large offering of sukuk.  
In December 2009, with a significant payment coming due on sukuk issued by 
Nakheel, Dubai World announced that it would be seeking to have the creditors of 
Nakheel enter into a standstill agreement to allow Nakheel time to develop a plan to 
deal with all of its creditors, including the holders of the subject sukuk, in an orderly 
and consistent manner. This announcement brought the financial crisis in Dubai to a 
head. Up to this time, creditors of Dubai World and its subsidiaries had assumed that 
the government of Dubai implicitly guaranteed the obligations of Dubai World and 
other Dubai state enterprises, notwithstanding documentation that explicitly 
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disclaimed any such guarantee. Those creditors, many of which were Western 
financial institutions, simply believed that the disclaimers were a legal nicety and 
that the government of Dubai would never let its state enterprises default on their 
financial obligations. They were surprised to find that their beliefs might not be well 
founded, and this discovery sent shock waves through the financial community.  
As many financial institution investors were relying on the backing of the 
government of Dubai, their attention to the structures of the sukuk they were 
purchasing and the terms of the documentation was perhaps not as thorough as it 
should have been. Their response to the announcement of the government of Dubai 
that it would not be guaranteeing the payment obligations of Nakheel was to instruct 
their legal counsel to review the sukuk documentation to better understand their legal 
rights and remedies. Often this analysis pitted sukuk holders against other creditors 
(conventional and Shari’ah-compliant), all of whom were trying to determine who 
had superior rights to the assets of Nakheel. This realization that their rights to assets 
and collateral was less than clear was followed by a further realization that the 
bankruptcy laws in the UAE (and in other jurisdictions where similar defaults were 
taking place) were quite inadequate to deal with this type of potentially complicated 
default and bankruptcy. Creditors and their counsel soon came to appreciate that the 
bankruptcy laws that existed in many GCC countries, including the UAE, were 
primarily liquidation laws that governed how assets of a bankrupt company would be 
liquidated and distributed, rather than restructuring laws that are intended to permit a 
financially ailing company to restructure its financial obligations so that it can 
continue in business. When payment on the Nakheel sukuk eventually came due, the 
Emirate of Abu Dhabi stepped in to provide financing to Dubai, thereby enabling 
Nakheel to make its payment on time.  
V.  REGULATORY RESPONSE AND REFORM 
Although this payment relieved the immediate crisis, the more significant 
development was Dubai’s issuance of Decree No. 57, which constituted a 
recognition that the existing insolvency laws in Dubai and the UAE were inadequate 
to deal with a large and complex restructuring of a domestic company. The 
centerpiece of Decree No. 57 was the application of the insolvency law of the Dubai 
International Financial Centre (DIFC), which is a financial free-zone in Dubai, to 
Dubai World and its subsidiaries. The insolvency law of the DIFC is based on the 
insolvency law of the United Kingdom, with some Australian and American 
features, and thus is designed to deal not only with the process of liquidating a 
company, but also the process of restructuring the ownership and finances of a 
company so that it can continue in operation. The Decree created a special tribunal 
that would hear all insolvency proceedings relating to Dubai World and it 
subsidiaries, and it stripped the UAE courts of their authority to deal with 
insolvencies. The tribunal, which was staffed initially with Singaporean and U.K. 
judges, was given wide powers, including the power of an “automatic stay” on the 
exercise of creditor’s rights. The Decree also provided a “cram down” mechanism 
and contained provisions that would allow debtor-in-possession financing, features 
that did not exist with the existing law. From a legislative standpoint, one can 
consider the introduction of a reformed and contemporary insolvency law in Dubai 
as being one notable reaction (or consequence) arising from the impact of the world 
economic crisis in the Middle East.  
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The impact of the world economic crisis on the Middle East, and in particular on 
the countries of the GCC, was similar to the impact elsewhere in the West − collapse 
of the real estate sector, credit constraints, and economic contraction. The reaction of 
governments of the GCC was similar to the reaction of governments in the West − 
support of financial institutions and provisions of liquidity to the financial markets.  
Islamic finance has established itself as an important component of the 
commercial and financial sectors in these countries, so it is interesting to examine 
whether this segment of the market performed better or differently than the 
conventional segment. Even though its promoters have claimed that Shari’ah-
compliant investments would fare better in a financial crisis than conventionally 
structured and financed investments, there were in fact more similarities than 
differences in performance. Finally, when problems arose, it became clear that the 
legal systems in some of these countries were not adequate to deal with the 
restructuring of struggling companies, and as a consequence, insolvency laws were 
being examined in a number of jurisdictions, and the Emirate of Dubai introduced a 
decree that had the effect of imposing a more contemporary insolvency regime on its 
key state enterprise.    
 
